12 July, 2008
Von Francois and Max Hoffman at Tannenberg
7 March, 2009
Francois's Disobedience at Tannenberg-Such Intellectual Honesty Does not Exist in Pakistan or Indian Armies
Francois’s Monumental Disobedience at Tannenberg
WRITTEN BY MAJOR AGHA H AMIN
PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL KARACHI IN December 2001
Von Francois was one of the outstandingly genuine higher commanders of World War I.
His “Magnum Bonum” achievement being his role in the famous “Battle of Tannenberg”.
Francois played a decisive role in “complete destruction” of the Russian Army at Tannenberg by disobeying General Ludendorf’s orders of attacking in a north easterly direction.
Francois assessed that if he attacked northeastwards as he was ordered most of the Russian Army would escape.
Thus Francois disobeyed Ludendorf’s orders and attacked south eastwards thus ensuring that the vast bulk of the Russian Army was encircled.
Francois’s action resulted in a complete German victory but also ensured that Francois was not promoted to the rank that he deserved because Francois’s mission oriented disobedience of orders annoyed Ludendorf who made it a point that Francois was sidelined !
Francois played a decisive role in “complete destruction” of the Russian Army at Tannenberg by disobeying General Ludendorf’s orders of attacking in a north easterly direction.
Francois assessed that if he attacked northeastwards as he was ordered most of the Russian Army would escape.
Thus Francois disobeyed Ludendorf’s orders and attacked south eastwards thus ensuring that the vast bulk of the Russian Army was encircled.
The Battle of TannenbergThe Battle of Tannenberg was a classic battle in the history of warfare! Its significance did not lay in the fact that the Russians were decisively defeated but in the fact that Germany was saved from instant defeat in 1914.
Initially two Russian Armies invaded East Prussia which was defended by just one, much smaller German Army. The German Army Commander Prittwitz lost his nerve and wanted to withdraw east of Vistula River.
commander.
General Max Hoffman the man who did the real planning before both Ludendorff or Hindenburg had even taken charge of the German Forces
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| Von Francois receives a captured Russian Imperial Army general It was a brilliant but highly risky plan but Hoffman took the calculated risk based on intercepted Russian telegraphic messages which indicated that Rennenkampf (who had earlier resorted to fisticuffs with Samsonov at Mukden railway station in Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5) was in no hurry to advance. |
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| General Von Rennenkampf |
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| General Von Hindenburg Hindenburg was a retired general and had been recalled for active military service. The duo were briefed by Hoffman the acting Chief of Staff and Hoffman’s plan was approved. |
Francois assessed that if he attacked as he was ordered to by Ludendorf now firmly in seat as the chief of staff the bulk of Samsonov’s army would succeed in withdrawing southwards. Initially Francois’s 1st Corps had been ordered as per the plan evolved by Hoffman to attack south eastwards towards Neidenburg.1
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| General Luddendorf |
Francois disobeyed this modification in orders and continued advancing towards Neidenburg leaving a part of his corps to watch Lahna. Francois had a close understanding with Hoffman, kept Hoffman posted about his plans and on his own decided to divide his corps into two parts “left half where it was, and strung out the other in a screen of small posts and patrols”.3
This was in direct disobedience to what Francois was ordered to do but Francois was a “Von” and the Prussian Army had the tradition of Seydlitz disobeying Frederick his king to win a battle!
The result — Francois’s corps captured 60,000 out of the total 92,000 Russians which were captured at Tannenberg! 4
Analysis of Francois’s Disobedience of
Orders at Tannenberg
Francois’s disobedience at Tannenberg led to a decisive victory while obeying orders would have merely resulted in pushing the Russians backwards!
While Francois’s disobedience did endanger the German 20th Corps, Francois was convinced that he must attack towards Neidenburg, which he did!
There was a reason in Francois’s outward madness!
Had there been a general of any of the British or the Indo-Pak armies in Francois’s place no victory would have been achieved! The Germans of that time were an altogether different breed!
They thought in terms of “Envelopment” “finding the true flank of the enemy” not about “what would happen in the next promotion board”! Francois was “competent” but he was also a “NOTORIOUSLY UNRULY SUBORDINATE”.5
Had there been a general of any of the British or the Indo-Pak armies in Francois’s place no victory would have been achieved! The Germans of that time were an altogether different breed!
They thought in terms of “Envelopment” “finding the true flank of the enemy” not about “what would happen in the next promotion board”! Francois was “competent” but he was also a “NOTORIOUSLY UNRULY SUBORDINATE”.5
Ludendorf knew this fact well and was all set to ensure that Francois obeyed his orders. Thus he made it a point to visit Francois to over insure that his orders were being obeyed. Francois proved sharper! He adopted a policy of “passive resistance”6.
He outwardly obeyed Ludendorf but in reality went his own way i.e Neidenburg! Francois writes in his memoirs
“On the 25th of August Hindenburg and Ludendorf called upon me at battle headquarters. I was instructed to make a frontal attack upon the hills of Usdau on the morning of 26th. I objected that by that time the bulk of my artillery and ammunition columns would still be on the way, and that consequently my corps would not be ready for action.To this Ludendorf replied ‘In that case you must attack with the infantry alone’.
There followed a somewhat acrimonius discussion which Ludendorf concluded by saying ‘The Corps must attack’. At the same time he referred the matter to Hindenburg saying ‘the final decision, however, rests with the C-in-C. The latter made no remark and both left my battle headquarters. At 8.30 p.m, I received orders in writing, signed by Hindenburg, instructing me to attack the lines of Usdau, on the 26th not later than 10 a.m. Once more I voiced my objection, but once more was overruled.
To attack Usdau without artillery and ammunition would have been a tactical blunder which might have led to the annihilation of my corps, for the Russians were holding the position with three divisions”7.
Francois then narrates the fateful incident about the Lahna affair i.e
“a new order arrived instructing me to take the pursuit of the Russians in the direction of Lahna.Lahna is six miles north of Neidenburg and would have led me into wooded and hilly country where artillery would have been useless and the troops would have advanced very slowly.
The gravest objection, however, was that such a movement would have afforded the Russians a golden opportunity of escaping towards the south. Consequently I did not change the orders I had already given and gave instructions to have this non-compliance with orders reported with my
reasons to army headquarters”.8
Thus Francois pretended that he was attacking on 26th towards Lahna but in reality he delayed everything that anything to do with moving towards Lahna!
This does not mean that Francois was selfish but simply that he was mission oriented!
Francois took the precaution of asking the German 20th Corps on the night of 25th “whether they were really so hard pressed that he must make an attack without artillery support (having deliberately delayed his artillery deployment!) and before he was ready, in order to save them!” 9
The 20th Corps “replied reassuringly that they were alright and that there was no need for him to compromise his preparations.”10 Ludendorf only realized on the evening of 26th that he had been fooled by Francois!11
Thus while Tannenberg was a great German victory, it also sealed Francois’s future advancement!
But Francois was a blue blooded Prussian Junker for whom self- advancement in rank was not as important as for a man with a middle class or more humble origin!
Here comes the difference in the British and German tradition! The British generals waited for orders while the Germans were mission oriented!
The Indians who the British commanded were worse since they were mercenaries!Ludendorf took Francois disobedience to heart and started actively gunning for Francois.
Francois was naturally cheesed off and unfortunately for German Army only partially disobeyed Ludendorf’s orders at the Battle of Masurian Lakes as a result of which the German victory was not as complete as it could have been!12
The Aftermath of Tannenberg
Ludendorf was a highly self-centred man and claimed the entire credit for Tannenberg. Hindenburg his army chief during Tannenberg was a large hearted man and did not take any credit.
It was only after the war once Hoffman’s two volume memoirs were published that the world came to know about Francois’s role at Tannenberg.
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| General Max Hoffman extreme left who revealed the truth about Tannenberg in his book below |
Ludendorf and Hindenburg had not aimed at making the Tannenberg battle an encirclement battle!
They were happy that the Russians were checked thus they sent a signal to the German Supreme Headquarters on the night of 28th
“The battle is won; pursuit will continue.The surrender of the two Russian Corps may well not be achieved”.13
In reality Francois’s disobedience which cost him his advancement, his service achieved surrender of both the Russian Corps.
Samsonov being a man of honour despite not being from a subcontinental martial race chose to commit suicide with his military revolver in a remote part of the East Prussian forests rather than
surrender!
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| General Samsonov |
Churchill’s verdict is not wrong when he states
“The credit of the victory belongs in large measure to General Hoffman, but its glory must be associated with General Von Francois, who though commanding only a single corps acted with that rare alternation of prudence and audacity which is the characteristic of true soldierly genius”.14
Francois’s true contribution was realized some two decades after the battle when Hindenburg, by then elected President of Germany, to make Francois sit in the centre while sitting on his right in the group photograph of the decennial celebrations of the Battle of Tannenberg.15
Carl Tschupik after the war defended Ludendorf and criticized Francois asserting that Francois did nothing extraordinary!
Tscuppik went on to compare Francois with General Steinmetz who had been sacked by Moltke the Elder for disobedience in the Franco German War of 1870-71.
The exact occasion being the Battle of Saint Privat which the French may have won because of Steinmetz’s blunder!16 Thus the sacking of Steinmetz!
The comparison was fallacious since the Commander German 1st Army’s Steinmetz’s disobedience had led to a serious operational failure while that of Francois had led to a great victory!
Tschupik’s line of thought was not supported by biographer of Hindenburg Emil Ludwig who also thought that Ludendorf did lose his nerve at the critical moment in the Battle of Tannenberg and changed the original orders of advancing towards
Neidenburg!17
Conclusion
Its an irony of history that Tannenberg was the foundation of Ludendorf’s fame and future rise in the German military hierarchy as the principal staff officer who made all critical decisions of WW One! On the other hand the real hero was sidelined!
Many years earlier, while serving in the Tactical Wing of the School of Armour Nowshera, I had a discussion with then Colonel Naeem (now Major General) on this topic.
Naeem observed that in the Indo- Pak scenario mission oriented orders would lead more to retrogade and negative results than positive and offensive movements as had happened in Francois’s case!
May be Naeem had a point! The army was not just a career like WAPDA for the Germans of Francois’s generation! Those men were the product of a historical process in which the Fatherland was more important than personal self-advancement.
Fear of forfeiture of rank had little meaning for men of that breed!
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BIOGRAPHY F GENERAL FRANCOIS
Born in Luxembourg to a noble family of Huguenot extraction, François was exposed to a military life from an early age. His father Bruno von François was a Prussian general and commander of the 27. (Preußische) Infanterie-Brigade. He was killed in action leading his men during the Battle of Spicheren on 6 August 1870, only a few days before the Battle of Sedan.
François, who had enrolled as an officer cadet, was by 1875 based in Potsdam as Leutnant of the 1.Garde-Regiment zu Fuß. From 1884 - 87, he attended the Military Academy at Berlin, and by 1889 had been promoted to Hauptmann (Captain) and had joined the General Staff.
By the early 1890s, François was posted to the XV.Armeekorps as a general staff officer based inStrasbourg. After a brief stint as company commander in 151. Infanterie-Regiment of the 31.Division, François devoted all his energies to the General Staff. In 1894 he was promoted to major and transferred to the 8. Division in Mannheim. By 1899, François was the Chief of Staff for the IV Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie Paul von Hindenburg and based in Magdeburg.
In 1901, François's mother, Marie took the family to German South-West Africa to follow her youngest son, Hugo von François who was a Hauptmann (Captain) in the Colonial Army. The family was based in the region during the Herero Wars, in which Hugo fought. François' other brother, Curt von François, was a well known scientist and researcher specialising in Africa.
In 1908, François was promoted to Generalmajor and placed in command of the Hessischen-Brigade inDarmstadt. François was promoted to Generalleutnant in 1911 and given command of the 13. Division for a brief period before his promotion to General der Infanterie and posting to command of I Corps under the8th Army based in Königsberg.
World War I
François began the war stationed in the province of East Prussia, where he was commander of the I Corps of the German Eighth Army. His task was to defend the easternmost regions of East Prussia against aRussian attack directed at the key city of Königsberg. The Eighth Army would be expected to hold out against significantly larger Russian forces until it could be reinforced by troops coming from the west after the expected quick defeat of France, in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan, which would guide German forces in the opening phase of a war in which Germany faced both France and Russia.
When war broke out in August 1914, François' corps faced the right wing of a two-pronged Russian invasion of East Prussia, led by Paul von Rennenkampf's Russian First Army. On August 17, the overall German theatre commander, General Maximilian von Prittwitz, nervously eyeing the advance of the Russian left wing far to the south, ordered Von François to retreat while under heavy attack from Rennenkampf.
François, reluctant to surrender any of his beloved Prussia, and naturally pugnacious, also felt breaking off while engaged would be deadly, and so he ignored Prittwitz' order, responding with the famous reply "General von François will withdraw when he has defeated the Russians!" He counterattacked Rennenkampf's massive army, bringing on the Battle of Stalluponen, and won a surprising victory while inflicting 5,000 casualties and taking 3,000 prisoners.
After winning the battle, François obeyed Prittwitz's order and withdrew 15 miles (24 km) to the west, where three days later he fought Rennenkampf to a draw at the Battle of Gumbinnen. Von François' aggressiveness resulted in the cautious Rennenkampf halting his advance westward.
Following that battle and a change of overall commanders (Prittwitz was judged to have lost his nerve by the German High Command), François' corps was transferred by rail to the southwest, to confront the Russian Second Army advancing into southern East Prussia under the command of General Alexander Samsonov. Although not trusted by the new German commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorffdue to his previous disobedience, François played the decisive role in the upcoming Battle of Tannenberg (1914). On August 27, François attacked the lead elements of Samsonov's army and began to make steady advances into their rear. Ludendorff, fearing a Russian counterattack by Rennenkampf, now ordered him to break off the advance. However, François twice ignored his direct orders and played a decisive role in the following encirclement and defeat of Samsonov's army.
When Hindenburg and Ludendorff went south to lead the 9th Army in Russian Poland, François remained with his corps in East Prussia and led it with much success in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes the following month. When General von Schubert, the new commander of the 8th Army, ordered him to retreat, he dispatched a telegram to the OHL describing his success and stating "the Commander is badly counselled." The telegram impressed the Kaiser so much that he immediately relieved Schubert and, on 3 October, gave von François the command of the 8th Army. Not long did he hold it. When Hindenburg and Ludendorff prepared their counter-attack from Thorn in the direction of Łódź, François was reluctant to send the requested I Corps, sending badly trained and ill-equipped XXV Reserve Corps instead. That was too much for his superiors. In early November 1914 von François was removed and replaced by General Otto von Below.
After some time spent "on the shelf", François received the command of the XLI Reserve Corps on 24 December 1914, and after a spell in the West, he returned to the Eastern Front in April 1915 where he took part in the Spring Offensive that conquered Russian Poland. He continued to distinguish himself. He won the Pour le Mérite, Germany's highest military decoration, on 14 May 1915 for his performance in the breakthrough at Gorlice, and had the Oak Leaves attached to it in July 1917, for outstanding performance during the Battle of Verdun. In July 1915 he was transferred back to the Western Front to take command of the Westphalian VII Corps in France, and in July 1916 Meuse Group West in the Verdun sector. However he never received any further promotion or serious commands under Ludendorff, and gave up his command in July 1918 and was placed on the standby list until October 1918 when he retired.[1]
Post-war
After the war ended, François returned home and wrote several books on military history, including the best-seller (in Germany) Marneschlacht und Tannenberg in 1920.
François, who had enrolled as an officer cadet, was by 1875 based in Potsdam as Leutnant of the 1.Garde-Regiment zu Fuß. From 1884 - 87, he attended the Military Academy at Berlin, and by 1889 had been promoted to Hauptmann (Captain) and had joined the General Staff.
By the early 1890s, François was posted to the XV.Armeekorps as a general staff officer based inStrasbourg. After a brief stint as company commander in 151. Infanterie-Regiment of the 31.Division, François devoted all his energies to the General Staff. In 1894 he was promoted to major and transferred to the 8. Division in Mannheim. By 1899, François was the Chief of Staff for the IV Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie Paul von Hindenburg and based in Magdeburg.
In 1901, François's mother, Marie took the family to German South-West Africa to follow her youngest son, Hugo von François who was a Hauptmann (Captain) in the Colonial Army. The family was based in the region during the Herero Wars, in which Hugo fought. François' other brother, Curt von François, was a well known scientist and researcher specialising in Africa.
In 1908, François was promoted to Generalmajor and placed in command of the Hessischen-Brigade inDarmstadt. François was promoted to Generalleutnant in 1911 and given command of the 13. Division for a brief period before his promotion to General der Infanterie and posting to command of I Corps under the8th Army based in Königsberg.
World War I
François began the war stationed in the province of East Prussia, where he was commander of the I Corps of the German Eighth Army. His task was to defend the easternmost regions of East Prussia against aRussian attack directed at the key city of Königsberg. The Eighth Army would be expected to hold out against significantly larger Russian forces until it could be reinforced by troops coming from the west after the expected quick defeat of France, in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan, which would guide German forces in the opening phase of a war in which Germany faced both France and Russia.
When war broke out in August 1914, François' corps faced the right wing of a two-pronged Russian invasion of East Prussia, led by Paul von Rennenkampf's Russian First Army. On August 17, the overall German theatre commander, General Maximilian von Prittwitz, nervously eyeing the advance of the Russian left wing far to the south, ordered Von François to retreat while under heavy attack from Rennenkampf.
François, reluctant to surrender any of his beloved Prussia, and naturally pugnacious, also felt breaking off while engaged would be deadly, and so he ignored Prittwitz' order, responding with the famous reply "General von François will withdraw when he has defeated the Russians!" He counterattacked Rennenkampf's massive army, bringing on the Battle of Stalluponen, and won a surprising victory while inflicting 5,000 casualties and taking 3,000 prisoners.
After winning the battle, François obeyed Prittwitz's order and withdrew 15 miles (24 km) to the west, where three days later he fought Rennenkampf to a draw at the Battle of Gumbinnen. Von François' aggressiveness resulted in the cautious Rennenkampf halting his advance westward.
Following that battle and a change of overall commanders (Prittwitz was judged to have lost his nerve by the German High Command), François' corps was transferred by rail to the southwest, to confront the Russian Second Army advancing into southern East Prussia under the command of General Alexander Samsonov. Although not trusted by the new German commanders Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorffdue to his previous disobedience, François played the decisive role in the upcoming Battle of Tannenberg (1914). On August 27, François attacked the lead elements of Samsonov's army and began to make steady advances into their rear. Ludendorff, fearing a Russian counterattack by Rennenkampf, now ordered him to break off the advance. However, François twice ignored his direct orders and played a decisive role in the following encirclement and defeat of Samsonov's army.
When Hindenburg and Ludendorff went south to lead the 9th Army in Russian Poland, François remained with his corps in East Prussia and led it with much success in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes the following month. When General von Schubert, the new commander of the 8th Army, ordered him to retreat, he dispatched a telegram to the OHL describing his success and stating "the Commander is badly counselled." The telegram impressed the Kaiser so much that he immediately relieved Schubert and, on 3 October, gave von François the command of the 8th Army. Not long did he hold it. When Hindenburg and Ludendorff prepared their counter-attack from Thorn in the direction of Łódź, François was reluctant to send the requested I Corps, sending badly trained and ill-equipped XXV Reserve Corps instead. That was too much for his superiors. In early November 1914 von François was removed and replaced by General Otto von Below.
After some time spent "on the shelf", François received the command of the XLI Reserve Corps on 24 December 1914, and after a spell in the West, he returned to the Eastern Front in April 1915 where he took part in the Spring Offensive that conquered Russian Poland. He continued to distinguish himself. He won the Pour le Mérite, Germany's highest military decoration, on 14 May 1915 for his performance in the breakthrough at Gorlice, and had the Oak Leaves attached to it in July 1917, for outstanding performance during the Battle of Verdun. In July 1915 he was transferred back to the Western Front to take command of the Westphalian VII Corps in France, and in July 1916 Meuse Group West in the Verdun sector. However he never received any further promotion or serious commands under Ludendorff, and gave up his command in July 1918 and was placed on the standby list until October 1918 when he retired.[1]
Post-war
After the war ended, François returned home and wrote several books on military history, including the best-seller (in Germany) Marneschlacht und Tannenberg in 1920.
